We study the effect of the adoption of collective auction clauses (CACs) on government bonds' yields by exploiting secondary market data on sovereigns quoted in international markets from March 2007 to April 2011. The presence of CACs is assessed security by security. Using a panel data approach, we find that CACs tend to lower yields for middle ratings, but their effect is weaker and weaker as we move towards the extremes of the rating scale. A U-shaped relation between the effect of CACs on yields and ratings thus emerges, which proves to be sound against several checks. The relation appears also quite robust throughout the sample periods. A simple theoretical model predicting such a pattern is provided, formalizing that CACs are helpful for ordered restructuring though less valuable when the probability of default is very small (best rated issuers) or the moral hazard risk is very high (worst rated issuers).
1.
Introduction Since the end of 1990s, a relatively large number of papers have empirically addressed the relationship between the adoption of collective action clauses (CACs) on sovereign bonds and their yield. Yet, no consensus seems to emerge on the sign of the link or even the conditions under which a link could exist. In fact, disagreement among authors arises even on the methodology to follow when conducting the empirical analysis and the nature and structure of the dataset. This is a rather uncomfortable situation as time is nearing when one of the biggest experiments in the field -the adoption of standardised CACs 1 on all new euro area-sovereign bonds from January 2013 -will become reality.
Against this background, the ambition of this paper is to take stock of a number of lessons gained on both fronts, methodology and dataset, and to offer a wider encompassing approach to the issue of testing the relationship between the adoption of CACs and the bond's yield.
We exploit a dataset running from March 2007 to April 2009 with yields on 292 securities listed on major international markets. Thanks to a new feature added by Bloomberg, we are able to associate precisely to each bond whether a CAC is in place or not, overcoming one of the main pitfalls of many earlier studies, which relied on the bond's place of issue -whether New York or London -as a proxy to gauge the adoption of the CAC.
The sample is large enough to allow us to focus on sovereigns, enhancing comparability (this means that we choose not to enlarge the dataset with corporates, which could give rise to forms of spurious correlations). Our study encompasses a relatively large number of countries, at various stages of development (this stands in sharp contrast with most of previous works which focus on emerging market issuers).
As a further add-on, previous studies have stressed the need for using secondary market data rather than primary market ones, as a way to mitigate instances of endogeneity, sample selectivity and omitted variable bias. We follow suit compiling our dataset with secondary market yields (average of bid and ask rates), taken monthly, for a total of 50 time periods. The exceptional market patterns occurred throughout the sample should ease the identification of any link CAC-yield; in other words, if no such link emerges in the data at a time when the default of sovereigns was more than a marginal tail probability, then doubts should be cast on whether CACs do affect in any material way the return asked by the investor when purchasing a security.
The bulk of our empirical analysis is about the estimation of a panel model. This is a relatively novel approach in this strand of literature, as most previous papers focused on a snapshot 1 The standard CACs included in new euro area sovereign bonds will include an aggregation provision as well. With reference to the problems that arise when the government in default has multiple debt obligations outstanding, useful references can be found in .
taken at a given time. An extension of the time dimension (on top of the cross-section) offers two clear advantages: it renders the analysis less dependent on the idiosyncracies in the data at a specific point in time and it allows checking if and how the link under examination has evolved with market developments (e.g., the impact of a downgrading of the country issuing the bond).
Naturally, caution must be exerted when judging the aptitude of any empirical analysis to predict the outcome of the euro-area experiment, simply because there is no precedent of a number of rich countries adding CACs on their domestic bonds all at once. Nevertheless, the reliance on a broader range of issuers allows examining in better detail questions like the impact of such clauses on securities rated double or triple A, to name a few.
Anticipating the gist of our results, we find out that the inclusion of CACs lowers the yield for bonds of issuers in the middle of the rating scale. In other words, for very good or very bad rated countries no statistically significant difference in yield emerges due to the use of CACs. The market, on its part, seems to acknowledge a yield discount for bonds endowed with CACs if the issuer falls in midst of the rating spectrum. This relation appears to be robust across the sample periods and it passes several robustness checks.
These results hint that collective action clauses are ex post useful for an ordered restructuring, should a default occur. So, a first condition is that the probability of default has to be nonnegligible. The lack of this requirement helps explaining why, for best-rated countries, CACs do not seem to have any effect. Second, by making a default easier, CACs might also make it more likely, if the issuer behaves opportunistically (the so-called moral-hazard effect). The second requirement is thus that the greater ex ante moral hazard does not offset the ex post benefit. For worst rated countries, the moral hazard enhancing effects of CACs may be larger than for better rated countries, because they bear lower moral hazard costs. A theoretical model is put forward to rationalize the intuition.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the empirical literature on the effect of collective action clauses on bond yields is reviewed; in Section 3 the dataset is presented and some descriptive statistics are shown. In Section 4 the econometric analysis on the panel data is reported and the main results are commented; while Section 5 addresses several issues of sensitivity analysis. In Section 6 a theoretical model is put forward, consistent with the empirical evidence.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2.
Literature Review Previous studies on the effect of collective action clauses on bond yields depict a number of different approaches, with respect to either the methodology or the dataset used; often subsequent research has moved from criticizing the pitfalls of previous works, either from a methodological point of view or on the ground of sample-construction or both.
The first systematic study on the yield effect of CACs is acknowledged to Tsatsaronis (1999) , who considered primary market data on a variety of international sovereign bonds issued after 1990. Since information on CACs was not available at bond level, the governing law of issuance was used as a proxy, i.e. it was assumed that all bonds issued under UK's governing law were endowed with collective auction clauses, while those issued under the US' were not, in accordance with the common practice in those countries. The author finds some evidence that CACs measured that way imply greater yields, but the difference is not statistically significant. Eichengreen and Mody (2000) assess the impact of CACs on borrowing costs recognising the importance of controlling for endogeneity in the choice of governing law (used, as usual in the first strand of the literature, as a proxy for the very presence of CACs). They find that CACs reduce the interest burden for more credit-worthy issuers, arguing that high rated borrowers may benefit from issuing bonds subject to renegotiation-friendly governing law. In a later paper Eichengreen and Mody (2004) dispute that bond ratings are relevant to the effect of CACs, so they run separate regressions for different rating groups. Using the same proxy-dummy for CACs and primary market data on a wide set of bonds including corporates, they find that CACs reduce yields for well-rated issuers and rise them for bad-rated ones; however, restricting the sample to sovereigns, these effects wane. Becker et al. (2001) point out a number of pitfalls stemming from the use of primary market data, arguing that secondary market data should be preferred: the latter arguably rise less endogeneity issues (whereas the former would require modelling the supply side too), need less control variables (since there is no need to account for general market conditions changing over time), and, presumably, benefit of more accurate data. Selecting two dates, one in 1998 one in 2000, they get however contrasting results: in the first one, CACs lower high-rated bond yields and have no effect for bad-rated countries, while in the second CACs rise well-rated countries' yields and lower bad-rated borrowers' (which is basically the opposite of what by Eichengreen and Mody found in 2004) . Pooling data together, no significance emerges. The methodology of Becker et al. (2003) is followed by Gugiatti and Richards (2003) , who consider for the first time post 2003 data, after the extensive debate on the inclusion of CACs in a big Mexican issuance in US dollars.The authors detect a negative effect of CACs, which nevertheless disappears when the interaction with rating is introduced. add four additional points in time selected in correspondence with very high or very low levels of market credit risk premium. To reconcile previous contrasting results, they consider a triple interaction term between the risk premium mirrored by bond spreads, CACs and ratings, to capture the idea that the rating value at which the effect of CACs on yields turns from negative to positive depends on market sentiment. However, assessing the effects of CACs using a triple interaction term is not straightforward; the suggested interpretation of the random effect estimation is that in good times CACs are beneficial for all but the worse issuers, while in bad times, CACs penalize all but the best issuers. Nevertheless, Haseler (2009) points out that this is not a true reconciliation of previous findings, nor the results seem to be robust since, for instance, the coefficient on the triple interaction is barely significant. Moreover, only four time snapshots are considered, thus shedding doubts on the legitimacy to fully extend the relation with market sentiment; moreover, the validity of random effects estimation should be tested.
A more substantial criticism is that posed by Gugiatti and Richards (2004) , who question the goodness of the governing law dummy as a proxy for the inclusion of CACs. Through a detailed inspection of a sample of bonds documentation, they find that, already well before 2003, several bonds under the US governing law were endowed with CACs, while several securities under UK governing law were not.
2 The fallacy of the governing law proxy casts serious uncertainty on the extent results from previous literature were affected by that spurious identification.
This scepticism somehow slowed the pace of research on the topic. Only after some years the exploration of the effect of collective action clauses on yields is retrieved by Bradley et al. (2008) , who restrict the analysis to US law issued bonds and investigated contractual terms to detect the actual presence of CACs. However, the sample remain quite heterogeneous, as it is made up of primary market data on bonds issued since 1986, thus encompassing very different frameworks and situations and being exposed to the afore mentioned criticism on primary market data. The authors find some weak evidence of a negative effect of CACs on yields, but they warn that it might hide a more general structural break between the pre and post 2003 periods 3 ; moreover, the interaction between CACs and rating is not considered. Finally, Haseler (2010) takes advantage of the newly available CACs field in Bloomberg inquiries to collect a sample of secondary market data not limited to emerging markets as customary in previous literature. 4 However, the effects of CACs are not the main focus of their study, so that the CACs dummy is included in one specification only (finding a negative but non significant coefficient) and its interaction with issuer rating remains unexplored.
2 Gelpern and Gulati (2008) also document a number of bonds endowed with CACs under the New York law which were issued before 2003.
3.
The dataset and some group-wise distribution of CACs Securities in the dataset are selected from Bloomberg according to the following criteria: issuance after January 1, 2003, US dollars denominated, issued in Global, Euro MTN and Eurodollar markets; 5 issuer being either a national or a regional government; maturity type being either bullet, or putable or callable; bonds being either zero coupon or having a fixed or floating coupon.
Besides the features described above, for each security the following fields are downloaded: 6 inclusion of CACs ; maturity date; amount issued; registration at SEC; issuer's country. The dataset is described in more detail in Table 1 . Figure A .1 of the Appendix, yields over time are shown through their mean, median, first and third quartile.
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The Global Bond market refers to bonds issued and traded outside the country and outside the regulations of a single country. In Euro MTN market bonds are traded that require fixed dollar payments issued and traded outside the US and Canada; securities in this market are issued with maturities of less than five years and are generally part of a program. Eurodollar bonds are US-dollar denominated bonds held in a foreign institution outside both the US and the issuer's home nation.
Over the same time span are recorded the bonds duration and the credit rating of the issuer country assigned by the three main rating agencies: Standard & Poor's, Fitch and Moody's. Ratings are mapped into a numerical variable starting from 1 for the best rating and increasing by 1 for each notch towards the worst rating. The composite rating variable used in the econometric model is obtained averaging across the three agencies. Other time series variables collected at the same dates are the VIX index as a proxy for market volatility, the spread between triple A and triple B US corporate bonds as a measure for credit risk market premium, and the US benchmark yield at 2, 5 and 10 years to account for patterns in the general level of yields over time.
From a preliminary tabulation of the distribution of CACs across the dataset variables, a number of descriptive evidence can be identified (see Figure 1 ). In particular: Yields are taken for each month at closing quote of the Friday before mid-month to limit irregularities related to calendar issues potentially occurring at the end/beginning of month or at the beginning of the week. • No clear-cut divide emerges for the use CACs depending on issuer's type or issuance year.
Both national and regional governments have issued bonds with and without clauses, although states tend to do so relatively more frequently (62% of the sovereign securities in our dataset feature a CAC, vs 47% of regional or other instances of local government). The proportion of CACs in new issuances followed a decreasing trend until 2008, reverting its trend thereafter.
• Within the dataset, we have countries which never rely on CACs (Austria, Germany, Hungary), and countries which always or almost always adopt them (Brazil, Columbia, Peru, Uruguay).There is also a mixed breed, as some countries have followed either of the two approaches (e.g. Italy, Canada, Venezuela, Turkey, Indonesia, etc.). There does not seem to be a sort of turning point when the sovereign switches from one approach to the other, as they seem to continue to intertwine over time.
• CACs are relatively more frequent for issuers in the middle of the rating scale, while very well rated and very badly rated issuers tend to use CACs less. This will be a recurring theme in our analysis, as the advantages in bringing in such clauses may be diverse in a non-linear way depending on the issuer's rating, while those with a middle rank could gain most.
• CACs are more likely to be present in bonds of longer maturity: the average tenure at issuance of securities endowed with collective action clauses is about 14 years and 2 months versus 8 years and 7 months for those without CACs. This could be related, ceteris paribus, to greater uncertainty and hence higher credit risk for bonds with longer maturity. There is no appreciable difference, instead, as far as the issued amount is concerned. 
4.
The econometric Analysis
The econometric model
Our basic panel model is as follows: where the dependent variable is the log of the mid-yield in the secondary market of security i at month t. The list of explanatory variables includes:
• CAC i , a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the clause is adopted and 0 otherwise;
• CACDIST i described below;
• RATING i,t , a measure of the rating of the security i as of time t along a scale which takes value 1 when rating is AAA and increases at each notch (say, 2 for AA+, 3 for AA, etc.); • SIZE i,t , the log of the amount issued of the security;
• REGION i , that tells whether the issuer is a local government (in which case the variable takes value 1) or not (value 0); • DURATION i and SQUARE_ DURATION i , compiled with the eponymous financial variables;
• PUT i and CALL i , dummy variables which take value 1 if the related options are embedded in the security and 0 otherwise; • EMTN i and EURODOLLAR i , that specify the market where the security is negotiated with the Global Market being the reference point;
• SEC i , whose function is to highlight whether the bond is subject to registration with the SEC;
• VIX t , the VIX index at time t which captures market volatility; 8 Finally, as shown in Figure A .2 in the Appendix, the sample is made up mainly by bonds traded in the Global market (78% of which include CACs; while such a share is more balanced in the Eurodollar market: 50%). More than 90% of bonds in the sample have standard bullet maturity, and little more than a half of them are endowed with CACs. Among securities not registered with the SEC (which make up almost 70% of sample), CACs are relatively more frequent than among registered bonds.
• BBBAAA t , as an index of the spread between triple A and triple B rated corporate bonds which may be regarded as a proxy for general credit risk market premium; • BM10Y t , the value of benchmark US yields at time t to account for general movement in yield levels. The variable CACDIST it is included in order to capture a possible non-monotonic effect of collective action clauses along the rating scale. It measures the interaction of the CAC dummy with the distance from the median value of the rating scale, assigning an increasing number to each notch (see Table 2 ). A significant coefficient on the variable CACDIST could mirror a non-monotonic effect of CACs depending on ratings; more specifically, it would support the occurrence of a Ushaped (inverse U-shaped) if the coefficient is positive (negative). Though this is not the only way to account for a non linearity, it turns out to be convenient and fits data better than other specifications (see Section 5).
The use of a panel data model allow us exploiting techniques prevented to cross-section analysis. In particular the presence of unit-specific unobserved characteristics, which may cause wrong inference or inconsistent estimatation in a cross-section framework, can be tested and controlled for.
between them and the regressors. Then we use the random effect (RE) estimator, which is more efficient than the FE one, but it is consistent only as long as the unit-specific factors and the regressors are exogenous. 10 This important condition for using a RE estimator is specifically tested for each and every sample through a Hausman-type test (Hausman, 1978) 11 . Provided this test does not bring evidence against the RE estimator, we further perform a Breusch-Pagarn test (Breusch Pagarn, 1979) in order to discriminate between the RE and the pooled OLS estimators: since the former basically belongs to the GLS-type, a failure to reject the null can be interpreted in favour of the latter, as it is the best linear unbiased estimator.
Once the estimator is selected, we proceed to inference and to test the significance of the net effect of collective action clauses at each step of the distance from the median rating.
The regression results
We present our results both based on three time subsets ( Results from the panel regressions in each and all samples are reported in Table 3 . The quality of fit appears adequate with a 2 R of 0.71 across the whole sample and similar results in each of the three sub-samples. In each regression, the random effect estimator proves to be preferable, given the failure to reject the null hypothesis in the Hausman tests, combined with the strong rejection of the null hypothesis in the Breusch-Pagarn tests. Being obtained by the same estimator, the results are 10 The FE approach transforms the original data by taking the so-called "within variation", i.e. the deviation from the individual mean taken over time. By doing so, the FE estimator involves a huge loss of efficiency, since as many unit factors have to be estimated as are the units in the sample; moreover, it prevents any inference on time-invariant regressors, because all the "between variation" is cancelled out.
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The test compares the time-variant coefficients estimated through random-effects with those obtained from the fixed-effects estimator. Under the null hypothesis both estimators are consistent but the RE one is more efficient thus being preferred if the null is not rejected; otherwise, besides the FE, other types of estimators have been developed to identify coefficients on time-invariant variables, such as Hausman-Taylor (1981) or error component two stage least squares (see Baltagi, 2008) . In the few previous works based on a panel data framework, the RE estimator has been taken without reporting the test to support its consistency.
easily comparable across sub-samples. Comparison across them reveals that estimates are rather robust, thus suggesting that even the most concise picture sketched by the regression on the whole sample would be worth considering. Before addressing the effect of collective action clauses, let us comment briefly on the estimates of the control variables. They generally take the expected signs, but not all of them add substantial explanatory power to the model. In particular, RATING has a positive and significant coefficient, implying that issuers with worse rating (which means a larger value of the variable, according to our scale) have to concede larger yields. Coefficients on the two duration variables suggest that bonds with greater duration are more exposed to interest rate risk and hence have to pay higher yields, however this occurs at decreasing rates because of a convexity effect. The VIX index tends to increase yields in market situations characterized by high volatility, while it is important to control also for BM10y as it captures overall movements in the benchmark yields.
There is also a positive effect of general credit risk premia (BBBAAA), but it is not significant, possibly because already captured by bond-specific credit risk measures such as rating. The yield tends also to rise when a call option is embedded, since the investor wants to hedge the risk that the security is called back before maturity, typically when their price is low, but the significance is not high. 13 The expected sign but no statistical significance is found for REGION and SIZE.
14 Let us now focus on the variables related to the use of collective auction clauses (CAC and CACDIST), which play a pivotal role for the purpose of research. Their coefficients are both strongly different from zero, with 1 β negative and 2 β positive. The magnitude of the two coefficients remains roughly steady as we move from sample to sample, suggesting that the effect might be quite robust across time. The net effect on yields due to the use of CACs, ceteris paribus, is given by:
. Hence, it depends on the position in the rating scale.
In the middle of the rating spectrum, CACDIST is zero or very small, so the effect of 1 β prevails: bonds endowed with CACS enjoy a discount with respect to bonds which are not. As we depart from mid-rating towards the extremes, CACDIST increases, thus magnifying the impact of 2 β which tends to reduce that discount, eventually erasing it. In fact, it is possible to test in each sample the null hypothesis of zero net impact of CACs at each notch of the rating scale. Results are charted in Figure 2 .
First, we observe that there is no substantial change across sub-samples. Second, mid-rated bonds have lower yields if endowed with CACs. Nevertheless, this discount declines as we move from mid-rating, to eventually vanish at the extremes of the rating spectrum.
The intuition behind these results is perhaps not a surprising one. Collective action clauses are meant to assist ordered debt restructuring when a default event occurs. Hence, they are valuable ex post, so the market may well be keen to acknowledge a value to CACs as they help limiting disordered default, holdout risks, prisoners' dilemma outcomes, and delays detrimental both to the debtor and to the majority of creditors. However, the effectiveness of CACs is subordinated to default being a non negligible chance: for very well rated issuers, the probability of default is so small that the market does not really care whether CACs are included, as they are less likely to be helpful. Thus, there is basically no reason to acknowledge a discount for them.
13
On the other hand, the evidence for the coefficient PUT is less regular, but this could reflect the scarcity of this option in the sample bonds (only three instances are present).
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The sign is expected because regional governments might have to grant a yield premium when compared to states. Similarly, bonds with lower outstanding might have to concede a liquidity premium. With respect to liquidity, likely better measurement should be considered to address this issue than the amount issued. A natural candidate in this respect would be the bid-ask spread; however its inclusion among explanatory variables would increase endogeneity issues. Since the main objective of the present work is not to identify the effects of liquidity on yields, we keep the amount issued.
Besides that, another condition for CACs being valuable to creditors is that the probability of deafault is, loosely speaking, exogenous to CACs' inclusion. Several theoretical and empirical works have put forward that there are fears that CACs may increase the moral hazard: by making debt-restructuring easier, they could make it also more likely, or at least may arise this suspecion, thus spurring a demand for a yield premium. Actually, one of the greatest costs of default for debtors willing to maintain access to markets is in terms of reputation and risk of being precluded that access (see e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) . These constraints are reasonably much weaker for badly rated debtors, which have already a low reputation or are typically less reliant on international bond markets for funding or can pretend more easily that an opportunistic is a true one. In this respect, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) remark that poorly rated countries have less access to international bond markets, being their funding sources mainly made by subsidies and loans from the official sector, and have higher propensity to debt repudiation. Hence it is likely that the moral hazard fears about collective action clauses are higher for countries with bad ratings. Then the effect of increasing the (perceived) default probability ex-ante moves in opposite direction of the effect reducing the loss given default ex-post.
The empirical evidence suggests that for sufficiently bad rating, the former effect is big enough to cancel out the latter.
Finally, note the magnitude and the shape of the effect appear fairly robust across the three sub-samples, thus suggesting that the relation between collective action clauses and yields are quite robust, once properly controlled for ratings and general market indicators.
Sensitivity Analysis

Time patterns
The panel estimation produces encompassing results across time. However, a different pattern hidden by data-pooling might be present within each sample. In order to address this issue, we perform cross-section regressions for each sample period. Note that this approach itself represents a contribution to research as previous cross-section [based] regressions on secondary market data dealt with only a few dates, thus being subject to the risk of making inference out of very particular market situations.
The equation estimated at each time t by OLS with robust standard errors is the same as in Table   4 reports the significance of the net effect of CACs on yields across time and rating levels. Rating   I II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I   AAA  AA+  AA  AA-A+  A  A-BBB+  BBB  BBB-BB+  BB From Table 4 we see that the U-shaped effect of CACs is confirmed: only mid-rated bonds have a significant yield discount if endowed with CACs, while the net effect is substantially 15 Each regression's results are not reported for the sake of space limitation, but they are available from the authors upon request.
negligible for countries at the extremes of the rating scale. 16 Moreover, the significance regions appear fairly steady over time, confirming also in this respect the findings of the panel analysis.
In Figure 3 , coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are displayed through time for CAC and CACDIST. 17 They retain the respective sign and are statistically significant throughout the whole sample, with a correlated pattern in their magnitude: when the CAC coefficient moderately increases in absolute terms, the CACDIST coefficient tends to do so as well. The patterns shown by the two coefficients seem also roughly consistent with the time divisions adopted in the panel approach. The cross section analysis essentially confirms the results of the panel analysis, which remains the preferred approach as it produces more parsimonious results, exploits information better, allows for a more proficient control over unobserved heterogeneity, and make it possible to account for the effects of time series variables (common across units), describing the general market situation, in order to disentangle the genuine CACs' effect.
16
The geometry of our indicators would suggest that, in some months at the furthest ratings, the net effect could become positive, thus implying higher borrowing costs for the inclusion of CACs. However, this interpretation requires great caution, for at least three reasons: first, it mainly concerns the first part of the sample, where there are not many observations available (see Section 5.4); second, it could be driven by the linearity of CACDIST, which implies a constant marginal effect while it could actually be decreasing (see Section 5.2); third, this result is not robust to the panel data analysis.
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Point estimates and significance levels are also reported in Table 5 .
5.2
Monotonic effect or different specifications for interaction between CACs and ratings The variable CACDIST is produced by the interaction of the CAC dummy with a linear distance from a pivotal point. Two considerations can be made: first, this is not the only possible way to measure distance: for instance quadratic or root distances can also be built. Second, the pivotal rating value from which distance is calculated is somewhat arbitrary. As for the first objection, these different measures are more likely to predict dissimilar results for the furthest ratings, but should not affect the evidence for an hump shaped pattern. Therefore, they gain relevance if the objective is to address what happens at the extreme ratings (e.g., whether a reversal of the impact occurs), which is not the primary focus of our analysis 18 . As far as the second criticism is concerned, the choice of a pivotal point is, up to some extent, ever arbitrary and the median value on our rating scale represents an educated assumption. Most importantly, results
should not be read as highlighting the punctual rating at which the CACs' effect hits the most, rather they present evidence of a middle-against-the-extremes hypothesis and a hump shape of this effect.
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In the light of these considerations, the comparison with another way of accounting for the dependence on ratings of the CACs' effect seems more important. used the straight interaction between CACs and ratings. This specification implicitly assumes that the effect is monotonic along the rating scale. In order to test whether data are better exploited by a monotonic versus U-shaped interaction between CACs and ratings, we proceed in two ways. First, we generate the CACRTG variable as the straight interaction between CAC and RATING, i.e.:
. Then, we split the sample in two, according to whether issuer rating is above or below 9 (our pivotal point for CACDIST). If the true interaction effect is monotonic, we should observe the coefficient on CACRTG being significant and maintaining the same sign in either subsample. Instead, what we find is that CACRTG is either non significant or negative in the regressions for good rated issuers (below 9 in the rating scale), while it is either non significant or positive in the regression for worse rated issuers (see Table 5 ). Moreover, the coefficient on CAC is either positive or non significant in the former subsample, while it is either negative or insignificant in the latter. If any, all this brings evidence for non monotonicity in the effect of CACs combined with ratings.
As a second approach, should the straight interaction explain data better than the nonmonotonic effect, its fitting power should be greater. In order to test that, we run the benchmark regressions without CACDIST, compute the residuals of these regressions, then regress them on (a constant and) CACDIST before, and (a constant and) CACRTG after and, finally, we compare the 2 R from the two models. In 48 out 50 regressions (see the last two columns in Table 5 ), 2 R from the model with CACDIST outperforms the one from the model with CACRTG, putting forward that the former has a greater fitting power than the other. (1) Residuals are obtained from regression of the benchmark model omitting CACDIST. The model with a larger R-squared is shadowed.
Legend: * 90% significance, ** 95% significance; *** 99% significance.
This combined evidence brings support to a non monotonic relation rather than a straight interaction between CACs and RATING. 
Asymmetric effects
The variable CACDIST implicitly constraints the effect of CACs to be symmetric between good and bad issuers located at the same distance from the pivotal point; this appears to be the most restrictive implication. Of course, this has to be interpreted in a statistical sense, meaning that the effect can actually be punctually different; in fact, a-symmetric effects can be allowed for and then their statistical differences be tested. This is accomplished by creating two different variables, CACDISTGOOD and CACDISTBAD: the former (the latter) assumes the same value as CACDIST for good (bad) issuers' rating and zero otherwise, where for good (bad) ratings we mean better (worse) ratings than the pivotal point.
Replaying the panel model with these new regressors substituting CACDIST, we obtain that the CACDISTGOOD coefficient is larger than CACDISTBAD's, thus suggesting that the pace at which CACs lower yields as we move from best rated to mid rated countries is steeper than the one 20 In this respect, a sound finding seems to have not been established yet in the literature: some works have just not considered the dependence of CAC's effect on rating, others have run separate regressions for high versus low rated issuers Mody, 2004, Becker et al., 2003) , but have included only the CAC dummy obtaining that the effect changes sign or significance depending on the time snapshot; others have considered a straight interaction term but have obtained not robust results (with switching sign) across different specifications. All in all, no sound evidence has hence emerged. Our analysis suggests that the actual relationship between CACs may be non monotonic, and a straight interaction term may fail to capture it.
at which CACs increase yields as we go from mid rated to worst rated issuers. In the theoretical model developed in Section 6, we provide a rationale for this piece of evidence. However, when the restriction of equal coefficient is applied, the evidence in favour of the less parsimonious model with asymmetric effects is very poor: in sample I and II, the difference is non-significant at conventional confidence level, while it is barely so in sample III (see Table 6 ).
We repeat a similar analysis for each and every cross-section. The t-tests on the linear restriction of equal coefficients fail almost always to reject the null hypothesis, thus suggesting that the assumption of a symmetric effect is not contradicted by data (see Table 7 ). Legend: * 90% significance, ** 95% significance; *** 99% significance.
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Only in two cross-sections out of 50 the null is rejected at 95% confidence level. Moreover, even a simple ordinal classification of the two coefficients does not show that one is systematically larger than the other. Detailed results from regressions and tests are available from the authors upon request. The changes in the sample size can raise the issue of whether results are due to the presence of CACs of different vintage and recomposition effects. Our benchmark results are relatively stable over time; however, if there are recomposition effects it is possible that the aggregate evidence hides a different pattern for CACs of the same vintage. This is also relevant as we have a dummytype information on collective action clauses, but we do not know whether and how they differ from each other. We address this point by restricting the sample only to bonds available since March 2007, the first time observation for sample I in the panel approach. In this way, it is possible to detect whether the U-shaped effect of CACs fades away for those bonds as time elapses. Crosssection regressions on the restricted sample confirm instead that CAC and CACDIST are always significant, respectively negative and positive, and the rating regions at which the two effects cancel out each other are similar to the benchmark ones.
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Another potential issue is whether results may be driven by some outliers. Some bonds appear indeed to be outlier once the explanatory variables are controlled for; several of them belong to few 22 Results, not reported here for space limitation, are available from the authors upon request. With respect to the benchmark results, we observe a slightly larger region of significant negative impact on yields in the middle of the time length, and a slightly smaller one in the last part of the time interval.
countries, in particular Venezuela. 23 We tackle this potential problem by adding a Venezuela dummy to the basic model, but the benchmark results are all confirmed, in particular those related to the effects of CACs. Note that adding a country dummy for each and every country is not very useful in our sample: as shown in Figure 1 , plenty of countries with just few issuances make up the sample; including a dummy per country would increase collinearity and reduce degrees of freedom, so one should be parsimonious with them.
6.
A simple theoretical model In this section we put forward a simple theoretical model to rationalize the findings of the empirical analysis. In particular, we have seen that at high and low ratings, the inclusion of CACs does not imply a discount on yield, whereas it does for medium ratings. Therefore, we need a model able to generate such a pattern. We can interpret the yield discount as a higher price of the bond.
With respect to prices, we hence expect to observe an inverse U-shaped curve.
Let us consider a simple model with two periods and two types of bonds, completely equal but for the inclusion or non inclusion of CACs. For the sake of simplicity, think of zero coupon bonds with 100 face value. Let us denote by the subscript c the security endowed with CACs and by the subscript n the security without CACs. Assuming risk-neutral investors, the price of each bond in the first period can be written as:
; EV is the expected value of the bond at maturity (second period); and ρ is an exogenous discount rate.
At the beginning of the second period there is a shock observable only to the debtor which determines whether the bond can be full repaid or not. We denote this exogenous probability of
. Clearly π is low for well rated issuers and gets higher as rating gets worse.
In case of default, creditors may get only a fraction 100 < i v of the nominal value of the bond.
For a number of reasons highlighted in the literature, it holds that c n v v < : without collective action clauses, problems of coordination, prisoners' dilemma outcomes, delays, etc. may substantially reduce the amount that on average a creditor may obtain. 24 This captures the idea that CACs are valuable ex-post a default has occurred, since they facilitate an ordered restructuring and limit the scope for holdouts and vulture creditors.
Should the default-shock not happen, the debtor may still declare default because, as mentioned, the shock is not visible to creditors. So a lender may get not fully reimbursed in the 23 Venezuela is the leading country for number of defaults in the modern era: ten since its independence in 1830 (Reinarht and Rogoff, 2009 ).
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The benefits of majority restructuring through collective action clauses have been modelled, amongst others, in , Weinschelbaum and Wynne (2005) , Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2007) Fernandez and Fernandez (2007) . Kletzer (2003) shows that CACs improves efficiency in lending and repayment, thus improving welfare relative to unanimous consent clauses. second period because of either an intrinsic or an opportunistic default. We denote the probability of an opportunistic default by )
We assume that i p is larger for countries with bad rating (and hence with high intrinsic default probability). Countries which have already a bad rating and a higher default probability incur in relatively lower reputation costs if they opt for an opportunistic default. 25 Moreover, these countries rely relatively less on the international bond markets for funding with respect to better rated ones, as they are in fact relatively more reliant on international loans or institutional programs. Finally, passing off an opportunistic default for a true default is easier for bad rated issuers than for well rated ones whose financial indicators are supposed to be sounder. 
Assuming convexity mirrors that the probability of opportunistic default increases faster as ratings move from good to bad levels.
Note that i p depends on i , i.e.: whether the bond is endowed or not with CACs matters for default probability. In fact we have to account for the fact that by making a default easier and less costly, collective action clauses might make it also more likely. This is the so-called moral hazard channel, which operates ex-ante. In this respect, collective action clauses induce a higher probability of opportunistic default, so it is assumed that n c p p ≥ at any level of π . On top of that, a moral hazard condition has to hold, stating that the expected loss from opportunistic default has to be higher with 25 For an overview on the literature on reputation in sovereign lending see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) . CACs than without CACs, otherwise the debtor would never be suspected of greater moral hazard because of CACs.
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We can now write the expected value of the bond with and without CACs:
The price differential between a bond with or without CACs will hence be given by:
2)
The difference in the expected value is equal to:
It is convenient to introduce the loss in case of default,
. By construction it holds that n c d d < . So it is possible to rewrite Eq. (3) as : 4) ) )( 1 ( ) ( nless sensitive is i p to π . 27 The simple functional form in Equation (7) ensures that the moral hazard condition is satisfied, while maintaining a similarity between c p and n p , as the former is basically an affine transformation of the latter. 28 It is now possible to write Eq. (4) as:
The net expected value is hence the difference between an increasing linear function of the default probability ) (
and a non linear function of the same default probability. The main result is summarized in the following proposition; in Figure 6 the net expected value as the resultant between these two effects is shown; while the analytical study is reported below.
Proposition 1: The net expected value from the inclusion of CACs with respect to their exclusion is hump-shaped, for a wide range of default probabilities and mild conditions on parameters.
The model predictions are hence consistent with the empirical evidence found in Section 4.2.
For low or high ratings (or "intrinsic" default probabilities) the net benefit of the inclusion of CACs is negligible: for well rated issuers this happens because the event of default is so unlikely that any benefit from an ordered restructuring does not matter much; for bad rated issuers, because even if the event of a true default is concrete, the benefit of an ex-post ordered default is counterbalanced by the risk that an opportunistic default might be declared. At medium levels of ratings the net benefit is highest because the chance of a true default is not negligible and in the meanwhile the risk of an opportunistic default is still low due to the higher reputations costs and the risk of lacking the access to the market.
The analysis reveals that such a hump-shape emerges, provided that model parameters do not exceed "threshold levels", beyond which there is monotonicity. In particular, as shown in Proof 1, the inverse U-shape fails to emerge if:
• β is too low: the moral hazard risk is not a great issue since the probability of an opportunistic default is not that bigger with CACs than without; so the net expected value is ever increasing in π ; Recall in fact that π is a less than 1 base. For bases greater than 1, ε represents the standard elasticity.
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It is still to be satisfied that
. This unambiguously holds for n p , and implicitly define a upper bound for β . the expected loss for default is thus always smaller with CACs; so the net expected value is ever increasing in π ; • ε is too high: the opportunistic probability is so scarcely sensitive to π that a worsening in rating produces only small increase in the probability of opportunistic default. In this case the ex-post beneficial effect of CACs always dominates.
Figure 6
Inverse U-shape of the net expected value A) Cost vs benefit curves and the net expected value of CACs 
30
• An increase in ε implies an increase in * π . Recall that ε measures the rigidity of the opportunistic default probability to the true default probability. If the moral hazard risk becomes less reactive to a worsening in ratings, there is scope to extend π before the marginal difference between benefits and costs from CACs is erased again. 30 In this case there is also an effect through the moral hazard constraint, since the difference between c p and n p is allowed to be lower. This channel moves in the opposite direction with respect to that highlighted in the text, but it is always dominated (see Proof 2). 
Effects for bad rated issuers
We have seen in Proposition 1 that the model may give rise to a hump shaped effect of collective action clauses on the net expected value along the rating scale. Hence, for bad ratings the net expected value from the inclusion of CACs is less than that at the middle of the rating spectrum.
However, the model does not predict unambiguously whether for bad issuers the effect is positive, negligible or negative, nor whether the effect is symmetric to that of the well rated ones. This remains an empirical issue. Nevertheless, the model suggests which parameters may favour the occurrence of a negative/positive effect.
As shown in Figure 9 , it is more likely to have a sizeable positive effect of CACs also for bad rated issuers if the loss given default is lower enough with CACs than without (high c n d d − ) and if the moral hazard risk is less sensitive to the debtor's rating (high ε ). On the contrary, if the probability of opportunistic default is sufficiently magnified when CACs are used (high β ), bad rated issuers may be charged by the market for the inclusion of CACs. value is positive, so bad rated bonds may be granted a discount, though lower than mid-rated issuers'. In the benchmark setting, the net expected value is negligible for worst rated issuers as it also is for best rated ones. Results from our econometric analysis suggest that the slope at which the beneficial effect of CACs on borrowing costs rises as we move from top to mid rated issuers is sharper than the slope at which it declines when we move from mid-rated to bad rated issuers (see Section 5.3); however this difference is generally non statistically significant and there is no strong evidence against the assumption of symmetry.
Therefore, the empirical analysis seems to suggest that the net yield discount of CACs for bad rated countries could be marginally larger than for top rated ones, but not in a statistically significant way. In the light of the theoretical model, we can point out that, for bad issuers, the exante moral hazard cost substantially balances the ex-post restructuring benefit.
Conclusions
Collective action clauses are contractual provisions included in the issues of sovereign bonds to ensure orderly debt restructuring. The European Council of 24-25 March 2011 decided that CACs would be included in all new euro area government securities from 2013 onwards. The conclusions of the March meeting state that "the inclusion of CACs in a bond will not imply a higher probability of default or of debt restructuring relating to that bond". On the other side, De
Grauwe (2011) provides some evidence of the bond spread increases following the first proposal to introduce CACs on the euro area stage.
The impact of CACs on borrowing costs is an empirical issue over which research has not found yet a sound consensus. In this work we update previous studies encompassing the financial and the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover we contribute to the literature by a more accurate bond specific tracking for the inclusion of CACS and a more homogenous sample.
The empirical analysis suggests that the effect of CACs on yields may vary in a non linear way according to the issuer's rating. In particular, it seems to emerge a U-shaped impact of collective action clauses on yields, with a discount acknowledged to issuers at the middle of the rating scales and no effect for those at the extremes. Our suggested interpretation is that for midrated issuers' creditors the advantage from CACs is greater because the probability of default is not negligible (so CACS are actually valuable) and at the same time the debtor is less suspected of opportunistic behaviour. Instead, for very well rated issuers the chance of default is low thus reducing the value of ordered restructuring, while very badly rated issuers face less reputational costs and are more suspected of moral hazard if they choose to include CACs that favour debt restructuring. 
